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Summary findings
Using data on country funds, Frankel and Schmukler  country fund holders receive the information and those
study how differential access to information  affects  prices react after NAVs have reacted. The 1995 Mexican
international investment.  crisis and the 1997 Asian crisis are two examples of this
They find that past changes in net asset values (NAVs)  type of behavior.
and discounts predict current country fund prices more  These findings are consistent with the hypothesis of
commonly than prices and discounts predict NAVs. The  asymmetric information, according to which the holders
price (NAV) adjustment coefficients are low and  of the uinderlying  assets have more information about
negatively correlated with the local (foreign) market  local assets than the country fund holders do.
variability - but not with the fund price (NAV)  Fran kel and Schmukler empirically test the asymmetric
variability.  information  hypothesis against the noise traders
NAVs seem to be closer to local information. They are  hypothesis. A theoretical model is presented in the
the asset prices that react first to local news. Later the  appendix.
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address:  sschmukler@worldbank.org.The new trends in international capital markets, namely securitization and globalization, have made
global investment more accessible to all investors. Nowadays, investors who wish to internationally
diversify their portfolio, but who have no specific knowledge of particular industries or firms, can
acquire shares of closed-end and open-end country and regional funds. These funds invest primarily
in equities from a specific country or region. The fund manager decides the portfolio of the fund,
and investors only become aware of the assets they hold at certain points in time--when the fund
manager reports the fund composition.
Country fund holders trade most of their shares in Wall Street at the country fund price. The
net asset value (NAV) is the dollar value of the underlying assets, which are individually traded in
each domestic market. The discount, equal to the percentage difference between the NAV and the
price, reflects how the holders of the individual shares value their assets relative to the country fund
holders.
In a perfectly efficient and internationally  integrated market, discounts would be equal to zero-
-since NAVs and country fund prices are two market values of the same assets. However, since the
shares  of closed-end country funds cannot be  redeemed, perfect  arbitrage becomes practically
impossible. Therefore, discounts can diverge from zero. In fact, country fund discounts are large
and variable  even for large liquid funds traded in developed capital markets. For instance, it is not
uncommon to find average discounts of around 15 percent for country funds like the German ones,
the French funds, the United Kingdom Fund, the First Australian Fund, and the Mexico Fund.
In this paper we exploit the fact that country fund discounts are different from zero to study
the  existence  of  asymmetric  information  in  international  capital  markets.  The  asymmetric
information  approach  is  appealing  in  several  respects.  On  the  theoretical  side,  asymmetric
information implies that  country funds trade at positive discounts. Rational country fund holders
1internalize the fact that they know little about each remote country or region, so they are willing to
pay less than relatively well-informed  domestic investors for the same assets. Moreover, asymmetric
information also explains the interaction between NAVs, funcd  prices, and discounts. The variable
that contains more information (the NAV or the fund price) will tend to predict the other variable.
The speed of adjustment will be determined by the amount of information contained in the variables.
This paper tests  the asymmetric information hypothesis, by computing exogeneity tests  for
most of European, Latin  American, and Pacific Rim country funds based  in the U.S.. 1 We test
whether the NAV, the price,  or both  adjust to  the long-run and to  the  short-run relationships
between NAVs and prices. In other words, we investigate which variable appears to be exogenous
(or predicted only by its own past): the NAV or the price. The results are obtained by estimating
error-correction models for each fund by full-information maximum likelihood (following Johansen,
1988, and Johansen and Juselius, 1990).
In a second stage, the paper tests  whether there is a statistically significant relationship
between the NAV-price adjustment coefficients and the variability of NAVs and fund prices. The
asymmetric information model  predicts  that  more noise  in  the  "external  market"  reduces  the
adjustment coefficients. In other words,  the less noise NAVs contain the faster prices react  to
changes in NAVs--when NAVs are closer to fundamentals. On the other hand, the "noise traders
model" (which provides an alternative explanation of discounts) predicts that more noise in the New
York market reduces the adjustment of prices to NAVs. Noise traders in New York disconnect
prices from NAVs (namely, from fundamentals). This paper tests which model is supported by the
data.
The remainder of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section I  summarizes the  existing
literature  on  country fund  discounts.  Sections II  tests  the  asymmetric information hypothesis.
2Section III introduces applications of asymmetric information. The theoretical model is presented in
the appendix section.
I. Average Discounts--The Rationale Behind Them
As mentioned above, country funds are known to trade at high and variable average discounts. In
other words, the prices at which country funds trade are in general lower than their Net  Asset
Values. Part A of Table I shows summary  results from a sample of 61 country funds based in New
York. The table demonstrates that, when statistically different from zero, mean discounts tend to be
positive. Discounts are significantly  positive for around 82 percent, 42 percent, and 53 percent of
the European, Latin American, and the Pacific Rim funds respectively. On the other hand, discounts
are significantly negative for only 12 percent, 25 percent, and 28 percent of the funds. 2 Average
positive discounts can be observed in Figure 1 as well, which plots two representative funds from
each region. The Korea Fund is an unusual case, where a premium persisted for a long time. This
fund was the only channel for foreigners to invest in Korean equities, so the demand for its shares
was high. When other  instruments like new Korean  funds became available, the  Korean  Fund
premia declined. 3
The cross-regional differences can be explained by the fact that most  of the country funds
started trading in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the 1990s, the international community has
been mostly optimistic about emerging markets in Asia and Latin America. Favored by low U.S.
interest rates, international capital flowed toward these markets. Part of these flows were channeled
through  country funds. For instance, Claessens and  Rhee (1994) show that  new country funds
account for 25 percent of the equity flows to  developing countries over the  1989-1993 period.
3TABLE I
SAMPLE OF 61 FUNDS, 114185-318196
PART A:
PERCENTAGE OF DISCOUNT MEANS, SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM ZERO*
NUMBER  DISCOUNT=
OF  100*1og(NAV/Price)
FUNDS  POSITIVE  NEGATIVE
EUROPE  17  82%  12%
LATIN AMERICA  12  42%  25%
PACIFIC RIM  32  53%  28%
+ The  results  are  computed  at  a 5% significance  level.Details  are  tabulated  in Tables  A1.2.
PART B:
DISCOUNT SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR EACH REGION"
NUMBER  MEAN  MEDIAN  STD. DEV.  MAXIMUM  MINIMUM
OF  DISCOUNT  DISCOUNT  OF  DISCOUNT  DISCOUNT
OBSERV.  DISCOUNTS
EUROPE  5646  8.6  11.3  13.8  50  -89
LATIN AMERICA  3163  4.3  3.4  15.6  83  -54
PACIFIC RIM  7439  -0.5  1.4  17.5  54  -94
All available  observations  for  each  region  are  used  to calculate  the  summary  statistics.  Summary  statistics  by  fund  are  displayed  in Tables  Al .2FIGURE  1
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compared with funds from the other regions) is not surprising. Optimistic U.S. investors probably
pushed up the price of the country funds from emerging economies--relative to the value of their
underlying assets--and discounts shrank over that period.
When all the  observations are  taken jointly,  Part  B  of  Table I  and Figure  2  show  that
discounts are positive for Europe and Latin America but not for Asia. The histogram for Europe is
somewhat skewed  to  the  right,  showing that  discounts tend  to  be  positive  except  for  some
observations that display large premia. The histogram for Asia is similar but it is more centered on
zero. Long left tails are consistent with large premia around the initial public offering and  with
optimistic sentiments, in particular around the time of the fall oif the Berlin Wall in 1989 and in the
period of strong capital inflows to  emerging Asian economies. The histogram for Latin America
presents both long left and right tails, implying optimistic and pessimistic sentiments with respect to
these countries.
These large and variable discounts have been rationalized in the literature in two  separate
ways. The first one  claims that transaction costs  and market  segmentation impose obstacles to
arbitrage. Therefore, NAVs and prices can differ from each other. In light of these barriers, Frankel
and Schmukler (1996) summarize a set of possible "arbitrage strategies" intended to take advantage
of the NAV-price difference. We conclude that, despite large discounts, there is no pure arbitrage
strategy that can be easily followed. Closed-end funds do not admit share redemptions. Therefore,
investors cannot treat the country fund shares as identical to the basket of underlying assets. In a
frictionless world, a rational arbitrageur could buy the country fund and sell short its underlying
assets whenever the fund traded at discount. However, closed-end funds are not meant to be open,
so short selling is difficult. Moreover,  different types of transaction costs--like management fees,
4FIGURE  2
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Histograms  are  construsted  using  all the observations  available  for each  fund in each region.non-simultaneous trading,  assets  denominated  in  different; currencies,  and  barriers  to  capital
movement--impose additional obstacles to arbitrage. These transaction costs have been theoretically
and empirically studied in Stulz (1981), Diwan, Errunza, and Senbet (1993),  Errunza and Losq
(1985), Bonser-Neal, Brauer, Neal, and Wheatley (1990), and Rogers (1994).
Other  papers explain the existence of positive discounts due to  the  participation of noise
traders in international capital markets. 4 This literature claims that a different clientele, composed by
both rational and irrational agents, holds country funds. By contrast, only rational investors hold the
underlying assets. Country funds are riskier than the underlying assets, because future changes in
noise traders misperceptions cannot be fully predicted. In a world of risk-averse investors, the price
of the  country fund will be lower  than the NAV.  Among the papers that  relate this theory to
domestic closed-end funds are Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), and Chen, Kan, and Miller (1993).
Other papers like Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman (1994), and Klibanoff, Lamont, and Wizman
(1996) look at the presence of noise traders among country fund holders.
This  paper  introduces  asymmetric  information into  the  discussion about  country  fund
discounts. Asymmetric information has been widely treated in the finance and related literature.
Some examples include Akerlof (1970), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), French and Poterba (1991),
Lang, Litzenberger, and Madrigal (1992), and Gehrig (1993). Asymmetric information can show up
in different ways. First, domestic investors may have access to  locally available information, that
foreign investors do not receive. Perhaps foreign investors can obtain the same information, but
must bear an extra cost to get it. Second, domestic investors may have the same information, but
interpret it in a different way. Third, there may be leaks in information, and domestic investors are
able to obtain it first. Fourth, country fund holders might lack information on how the fund is being
managed.
5Even though there is an information disadvantage, global investment may still look attractive
as a consequence of high expected returns and diversification benefits (especially from emerging
markets).  Small uninformed investors  may be  more  attracted  to  buy  country  funds than  the
underlying assets, since transaction costs are far lower. Also, they know that country fund managers
are generally more informed than they are about the country, and can allocate the portfolio of assets
more wisely. As a consequence, small international investors will prefer country funds to  purchase
local securities.
This paper claims that "foreign investors"--small international investors--realize that they are
less  informed  than  "domestic  investors"--local  and  big  foreign  investors--when  buying  other
countries'  equities. Foreign investors know that they will do worse  on average when investing
abroad with respect to domestic residents. As a consequence, other things equal, foreign investors
are willing to pay less for the same assets, and average positive discounts are observed. The effects
of introducing asymmetric information are formally presented in the Appendix.
The idea of asymmetric information differs from the noise traders model, in which country
fund. holders randomly overestimate or underestimate future returns on foreign investment. In this
paper, foreign investors are rational agents who try to  assess the best forecast of future retums.
However,  since they  are  far  away  from  the  market  in  which  they  invest,  they  face  higher
uncertainty. In  other  words,  due  to  asymmetric information, foreign investors  have a  "higher
subjective variance" than domestic investors--even though their average forecast is unbiased. They
perceive investment in a foreign country as being riskier than domestic investors do.
This paper concentrates only on country funds. The same idea can be  applied to  domestic
closed-end country funds, where most of the previous literature has focused. Small investors are the
ones that usually buy domestic closed-end funds, since--compared with large investors--they have
6less information about particular firms and industries. Therefore., asymmetric information might also
explain discounts in domestic funds. Nevertheless, the information asymmetry is likely to  show up
more clearly in the case of closed-end country funds given that the underlying assets are located in
distant countries. 5
II. Empirical Testing
Asymmetric information yields three testable empirical implications. First, discounts tend to  be
positive on average. Second, past large discounts and NAVs help to predict current country fund
prices. Third, the adjustment coefficients are negatively correlated with the presence of noise in the
other markets. We already showed in Table I that discounts are in general greater than zero for
most  of  the  funds. In this  section, we  empirically analyze the  other  two  implications of  our
hypothesis.
7A. Testing for Exogeneity in NAVs and Prices
In this subsection, we try to determine which variable tends to be exogenous: the NAV or the fund
price.  In  other  words,  we  study whether  lagged  short-run  changes in  NAVs  and  prices are
significant in explaining current changes in each variable, and which variable is the one that adjusts
to  the  long-run  NAV-price  relationship. We  expect  that  the  variable  that  comprises  more
information about the fundamental values of the assets is the one that tends to be exogenous with
respect to the other variable. If NAVs are closer to changes in fundamentals, they will tend to react
first. Thus future price changes will be predicted by present NAV changes. If prices are the ones
closer to  fundamentals, the opposite relationship will hold. In summary, we investigate whether
NA.Vs  tend to predict prices more often than prices tend to predict NAVs.
Exogeneity of NAVs and prices needs to be analyzed in the context of non-stationarity. Our
previous results show that most country fund NAVs and prices are I(1), integrated of order  1 6
Except for some European and Asian funds, we are not able to reject non-stationarity. Moreover,
we computed unit root tests for the variables in first differences; non-stationarity is widely rejected.
Even though NAVs and prices seem to be non-stationary, we expect that the variables do not
diverge without bound from each other. Country fund NAVs and prices are ultimately two different
values of the same assets, so they tend to move together in the long run. In econometric terms, we
expect to find cointegration between the variables. Specifically,  NAVs and prices may be linked by a
stationary (linear) long-run relationship Pg =  ir+X N,+E, where the  mean-zero error  term  £  is
stationary, &4~(O).
Frankel and Schmukler (1997) reports the Johansen (1988), and Johansen and Juselius (1990)
tests for each fund. The results vary across regions, but we find a number of cases in which the
presence of one cointegrating vector cannot be rejected. For 8 out of  17 funds we cannot reject
8cointegration among European funds. For 4 out of 12 funds there is evidence of cointegration in
Latin Amnerican  funds. In the case of Asia, cointegration is not rejected for 17 out of 32 funds. We
also test for stationarity once the cointegrating vectors are constrained to be (1, -1). For almost all
of the cases, the tests reject non-stationarity in discounts.
The  fact  that  there  is  cointegration  is in  itself  interesting since  it confirms the  a-priori
economic intuition that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship linking country fund NAVs and
prices. We can obtain more information from the cointegration tests. For example, 65 percent of the
European fund, 66 percent of the Latin American funds, and 47 percent of the Pacific Basin funds
cannot reject that  the fitted  Xs are  1. That means that  shocks to  NAVs  (prices) are  entirely
transmitted to  prices (NAVs) in the long run. This finding also confirms our economic intuition,
which says that  changes in the value of the underlying asseits (country fund) will eventually be
entirely reflected in the corresponding country fund price (NAV).
Given that the variables are non-stationary, usual Granger-causality tests  of the variables in
levels--exogeneity tests in the vector-autoregression (VAR) framework--do not yield statistics that
follow standard distributions. On the other hand, VAR processes in first differences omit important
information contained in the long-run relationship, and consequently may have specification biases.
Nevertheless, both the short-run and the long-run dynamics are embedded in the error-correction
model (ECM). The first  differences of NAVs and prices are related to  the  one-period lagged
cointegrating vector, and to lagged first differences of both variables,
L  L
AP,  = a,  +a1 (PI] -ff-ANt)+YZr 1 iAAfi  +±  8l 1i&PA  i +vt
i=  (1)
L  L
tI  22  2 (PI-  t-  t-I)  E  Y2i-i  +E  2 iAN_i  t
9We estimate the entire model (1) by full-information  maximum likelihood (FIML). In this way,
we can simultaneously  obtain estimates for 7t and X, along with estimates for the other parameters
of the model. Representative results from the FIML procedure are displayed in Table II.  Large
fundls  from each of the three regions are chosen. We select funds with a long history, which are not
affected by particular optimism around a  recent  IPO. 7 Fitted  Xs with their  standard errors  are
displayed in the first two columns of Table II.
The rest  of Table II tabulates exogeneity tests.  Weak exogeneity tests--with respect to the
parameters 7t and A--are computed by looking at the adjustment toward the long-run relationship.
Given that there is cointegration, either the NAV, the fund price, or both respond to deviations in
the long-run relationship. A significant  fitted al  (a2) means that the price (NAV) adjusts to changes
in the cointegration relationship. 8 Table II also displays the point estimates of a,  and a2,  since
besides their statistical significance  their size is also interesting.
Our results show that significant a,s  are greater than significant a2s.  Significant aXls range
from values as low as 2 percent for the Korea Fund, and as high as 28 percent for the Templeton
Vietnam Fund. Significant a2s range from values as low as 3 percent for the India Growth Fund,
and as high as 13 percent for the Jardine Fleming India Fund. These coefficients imply half lives for
prices that go from less than 2 weeks to  18 weeks, and half lives for NAVs that go from more than
3 weeks to  18 weeks. The average significant al  (a2)  is -0.11  (0.075).9 They suggest that  the
adjustments are relatively slow, but higher in absolute value for prices than for NAVs. One could
argue that  these  results  support  the  asymmetric information hypothesis. Prices  react  more to
changes  in  past  discounts  because  deviations  from  the  long-run  equilibrium  convey  more
information for prices than for NAVs.
10TABLE II
FULL-INFORMATION  MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ESTIMATION  RESULTS
THE  CASE  OF 6 REPRESENTATIVE  FUNDS  (2 FOR EACH  REGION)*
EXOGENEITY  TESTS  (WALD  STATISTICS)  AND  NORMALIZED  COINTEGRATING  VECTORS
4 LAGS -SAMPLE  114185-3/8196
FITTED  FITTED LONG-RUN  ADJUSTMENT  (Weak  Exogeneity)  SHORT-RUN  ADJUSMENT  GRANGER-NONCAUSALITY(strong  Exogeneity)
LAMBDA  STAND.  Chi-Squared  (1)  Chi-Squared  (2)  Chi-Sauared(3)
EUROPEAN  FUNDS:  ID  No.  OBS.  ERROR HO:alphal=O  alphal  HO:  alpha2=0  alpha2  HO:gammal1=0  HO  gamma2'=O  HO:alpha1  & gamma1'=0  HO:  alpha2  & gamma2'=0
ITALYFUND  ITA  499  0.87  0.165  6.32  -- 0.050_  2.56  0.021  11.10  1.60  19.08 ...  5.46
SWISSHELVETIAFU SWZ  443  0.97  0.082  5.49  -0.076  1.07  0.019  31.81  1.41  48.11 - 2.87
LATIN  AMERICAN  FUNDS:
CHILE  FUND  CH  332  0.93  0.082  9.35  -0.083  2.46  -0.027  22.78  5.20  37.94  - 6.75
MEXICO  FUND  MXF  555  1.18  0.046  1.12  -0.027  7.38 *-  0.051  18.74  8.03 *  25.41  - 26.89
PACIFIC RIM FUNDS:  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
KOREA  FUND  KF  584  0.69  0.306  4.37  -0.023  0.16  -0.002  19.13  8.74  24.17  8.74
MALAYSIA  FUND  MF  453  1.09  0.116  13.04 ^  -0.085  0.19  -0.007  6.73  40.34  26.42 ^41.2
'All the results  are  tabulated  in Tables  A4  and AS.
'('),  []  Implies  significance  at 10%,  (5%),  [1%).Table II also reports tests regarding the short-run adjustment. These tests look at whether the
set of fitted y 1 and Y2  are jointly zero. A vector yi (Y2) different from zero means that current fund
prices (NAVs) adjust to past changes in NAVs (prices). Finally, Table II displays statistics that test
whlich  variable is "strongly exogenous:" the NAV, the price, or both. We call "strong exogeneity"
or "Granger-noncausality" the cases when the fund NAV or price is explained only by its own past--
but not by the long-run equilibrium or by the recent history of the other variable. In other words,
the strong exogeneity test looks at whether cc,  and y, (or c2 and Y2)  are jointly zero.
We use different specifications to compute exogeneity tests in order to illustrate how results
vary across models. We are reluctant to work with only one model since we want to make sure that
our results  are robust to  various  specifications. The exogeneity tests  are computed  from three
models. First, we assume that  cointegration exists in all the funds, even when the tests failed to
detect it. Second, we do not include the long-run relationship for the cases where we failed to find
evicdence  of cointegration. Third, we assume that none of the funds is cointegrated. For each model
we have tried several lag structures and restrictions on the variables; the case of 4 lags is reported
here.' 0 Further lags are statistically insignificant and the results appear very robust to various lag
structures. In addition, the estimates do not tend to change across specifications when restrictions
on the long-run relationships are imposed."
Because  the  reader might be  interested in a  general conclusion rather  than  in particular
country funds, Table III summarizes all the results computed in Frankel and Schmukler (1997). The
table shows the percentage of funds for which NAVs and fund prices adjust to short-run and long-
run changes. In addition, Table III displays the median Wald statistic for each test across every
group of funds. The table shows that NAVs tend to be the exogenous variables. In other words,
past  changes in NAVs help to  explain present changes in prices but  not  otherwise. Moreover,
11TABLE  III
PERCENTAGE  OF FUNDS  FOR WHICH  THEIR NAVS  AND PRICES
REJECT EXOGENEITY AT A 5%  SIGNIFICANCE  LEVEL
FULL-INFORMATION  MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ESTIMATION
4 LAGS  - SAMPLE  141485-3/8/96
PART  A: ASSUMES  LONG-RUN  ADJUSTMENT  (Weak Exogeneity,  w.e.)
COINTEGRATION  HO:  Prices  Median Wald  HO:  NAVs  Median  Wald
Weakly Exog.  Statistic  Weakly Exog.  Statistic
EUROPEAN  FUNDS  65%  5*  6%0
LATIN  AMERICAN  FUNDS  25%  2.09  17  %  1.80
PACIFIC  RIM FUNDS  50%  3.69*  1  28%  1.07
TOTAL  50%  3.91*T*  20%  1,15
SHORT-RUN  ADJUSMENT
HO:  Prices  Median  Wald  HO:  NAVs  Median  Wald
Do Not  Adjust  Statistic  Do Not Adjust  Statistic
EUROPEAN  FUNDS  82%/  16.80-w*  12%o52
LATIN  AMERICAN  FUNDS  67%  15.J77***  17%  4.08
PACIFIC  RIM FUNDS  46.50  22%6
TOTAL  5RMF7%  11.19**  18%  5
GRANCER-NONCAUSALITY  (Srong Exogeneity,  s.e.)
HO:  Prices  Median Wald  HO:  NAVs  Median  Walc
Strongly  Exog.  Statistic  Strongly  Exog.  Statistic
LUROPEAN  FUNDS  88%  32.284***  -245%  7429
ATIN  AMERICAN  FUNDS  83%  16,84***  25%  6.34
PACIFIC  RIM FUNDS  56%  11.58*  34%  9.86*
TOTAL  70%  -- ' 18.'38*'*'*  '  30%  8.45
PART  B: DOES  NOT  1 LONG-RUN  ADJUSTMENT  (Weak Exogeneity,  w.e.)
ASSUME  COINTEGRATION  HO:  Prices  Median Wald  HO:  NAVs  Median  Wald
Weakly Exog.  Statistic  Weakly Exog.  Statistic
EUROPEAN  FUNDS  79j/o  '  ' 6':46**  7%  0.89
LATIN  AMERICAN  FUNDS  38%  2.01  25%  3.15*
PACIFIC  RIM FUNDS  59%  4.33**  33%  1.71
TOTAL  61%  4.46**  _  24%  1.76
SHORT-RUN  ADJUSMENT
HO:  Prices  Median  Wald r  HR0:NVs  Median  Wala
Do Not  Adjust  Statistic  Do Not Adjust  Statistic
EUROPEAN  FUNDS  82%  1T8.81**  12%  6.35
LATIN  AMERICAN  FUNDS  67%  S1577***  17%  4.
PACIFIC  RIM FUNDS  44%  8.19*  o22%  6.58
TOTAL  59%  1f2.64**  18%  6.1
GRANCER-NONCAUSALITY  (tong  Exogeneity,  s.e.)
HO:  Prices  Median  Wald  HO:  NAVs  Median  Wald
Strongly  Exog.  Statistic  Strongly  Exog.  Statistic
EUROPEAN  FUNDS  86%  I  ''-  32.31***  *  29.61
LATIN  AMERICAN  FUNDS  100%  16.84**[  25%  7.34
PACIFIC  RIM FUNDS  59%  14.74***  37%  10.22*
TOTAL  73%  20.05*  3  2
PART  C: ASSUMES  SHORT-RUNADJUSMENT 
NO COINTEGRATION  HO:  Prices  - Median  Waldl  H:  NAVs  Median  Wald
Do Not  Adjust  Statistic  [Do  Not  Adjust  Statistic
EUROPEAN  FUNDS  71%  |  [  1
LATIN  AMERICAN  FUNDS  75%  20.20***  I  25%  /  _4.74  1
PACIFIC  RIM FUNDS  50%  9.32*  r  44%  -7.81*
TOTAL  61%  -- 7  |7  1.*  |  3%  |  6
*, (**), [*'*] Implies  significance  at 10%, (5%), [1%].deviations from the long-run equilibrium seem to be more informative for prices than they are for
NAVs. The results hold for the case when cointegration is assumed, but even more strongly for the
one when cointegration is not assumed. Overall, NAVs tend to be strongly exogenous. Table III
shows that in 70 and 73 percent of the cases NAVs are strongly exogenous, depending on whether
cointegration is assumed or  not.  Meanwhile, prices are only  strongly exogenous  in 30  and 33
percent of the cases respectively. When cointegration is ruled out, the results show that for 61 (33)
percent of the cases NAVs (prices) are exogenous.
A closer look at Table III suggests interesting conclusions. First, all the exogeneity tests for
eveiy region yield the same results: NAVs tend to be the exogenous variable, while fund prices are
the ones that adjust to  past changes in NAVs. This evidence seems to  support the hypothesis of
asyrnmetric information in  all regions.  Second,  this  relationship holds even more  strongly  for
Europe than for Latin America or the Pacific Rim. This fact is not  entirely surprising. We have
already indicated that discounts are positive for a smaller proportion of Latin American and Pacific
Rim funds than European funds. As mentioned before, these funds cover a period of high capital
flows to emerging countries in Asia and Latin America. A significant  part of these flows was due to
investors that bought foreign equities in the form of ADRs and country funds. Therefore, optimistic
foreign investors may have generated a boom in country fund prices, that later on raised local stock
market prices.
Our results are consistent with the fact that  NAVs are closer to  information about local
market fundamentals, and  consequently react first. Nevertheless, we recognize that  in principle
these results  are also  consistent  with previous  papers--which assumed that  noise  traders  hold
country funds but  not the underlying assets. If country fund holders repeatedly underpredict or
overpredict changes in fund prices, they are the ones who will adjust to  changes in NAVs (which
12are closer  to  fundamentals). We  explore  further  implications of  both  hypotheses  in  the  next
subsection.
B. Why Are Adjustments Slow?
If  investors  are  fully rational,  even  if  subject to  asymmetrc  information, they  will use  the
information in the NAVs, which is published weekly. Fund prices will mimic NAVs as soon as
NAVs become available every week. However, the ECM results show that prices follow NAVs at a
slower pace than that implied by asymmetric information among rational investors. It takes several
weeks to complete the adjustment. Several reasons may explain this sluggishness.
First, the presence of noise traders may delay the adjustnnent since foreign investors face a
signal-extraction problem. Changes in NAVs can be caused either by misperceptions among noise
traders (who may also participate in the local market) or by changes in the country's fundamentals.
Second, prices may be  slow to  react  due to  market illiquidity. Many country fund markets are
shallow: few transactions take place. Therefore, prices will move toward NAVs only as transactions
occur. 
12
Third, if there are noise traders only in the country fund market, as the noise traders literature
suggests, prices will be disconnected from changes in NAVs. Noise traders'  estimates of the asset
values differ from the fundamental values, reflected by the NAVs. So the link between NAVs and
prices is distorted by noise traders'  misperceptions. Fourth, it could be the case that domestic and
foreign investors have different preferences or are part of different clienteles. So NAVs and fund
prices move according to each market's preferences, although they may eventually move together in
the long run. Therefore, a weak connection is found between NAVs and prices in the short run.
13This section tests  whether the  statistical evidence is consistent with any of the competing
explanations of  sluggish responses. We  relate the  adjustment coefficients to  measures of noise
trading and market liquidity. As a proxy for noise trading we take the standard deviation of first-
differenced log NAVs and prices, given that the variables in levels are non-stationary. We assume
that more noise in the markets leads to increasing variability in NAVs and prices. As a proxy for
markelt  liquidity  we take the magnitude of each fund's total assets.
The first  part  of Table  IV  shows  regressions of the  fitted  price  adjustment coefficients
(negative fitted als)  on three  explanatory variables: the  standard deviations of first-differenced
NAVs and prices, and the value of the country funds' assets. The first three regressions show that
more noise in the local market implies lower adjustment coefficients for country fund prices. They
also  show that  the value  of  the  total  assets  is  not  statistically significant in  explaining price
adjustrnents. So the market illiquidity explanation is not supported by the data. Lastly, they show
that noise in the country fund market is not statistically  related to the adjustment coefficient and has
the wrong sign. The fourth and fifth regressions concentrate on the NAV adjustment coefficients.
They suggest that the standard deviation of first-differenced log prices is negatively related to the
fitted ce 2s. In other words, more volatile country fund prices imply slower adjustment of NAVs to
prices.
In  summary, results from  Table IV suggest that  the  speeds of  adjustment are negatively
related to  the  variability of the  "external market."  The  adjustment of  country  fund prices  is
negatively related to the variability of the NAVs, while the adjustment of NAVs is negatively related
to the variability of the fund prices. This suggests the typical signal-extraction problem of markets
with imperfect information. The statistical relationship holds more strongly for the price adjustment
case. Finally, the noise trader models would predict that more noise in the country fund market is
14TABLE  IV
WHAT  EXPLAINS  SLOW  ADJUSTMENT  COEFFICIENTS?
ADJUSTMENT  COEFFICIENTS  VERSUS  NAV  AND PRICE  VARIABILITY
HETEROSKEDASTICITY-CONSISTENT  STrANDARD  ERRORS
Dependent  Variable: PRICE  ADJUSTMENT
(negative  alphal coefficients,  higher  values  imply  faster  adjustmeints)
Repgression 1:
Number  of Observaffons:  61
Independent  Variables:
Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic
Constant  0.12  0.02  5.35
St. Dev.  of First-Diff.  Log  NAVs  -1.42  0.57  -2.48
Adjusted  R-squared  0.07  S.E.  of regression  0.06
Rearession  2:
Number  of Observations:  56
Independent  Variables:
Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic
Constant  0.13  0.03  5.01
St.  Dev.  of First-Diff.  Log  NAVs  -1.31  0.57  -2.31
Total  Assets  -3E-05  4E-05  -0.85
Adjusted  R-squared  0.06  S.E.  of regression  0.06
Regression 3:
Number  of Observations:  61
Independent  Variables:
Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic
Constant  0.09  0.04  2.53
St.  Dev.  of First-Diff.  Log  NAVs  -1.76  0.79  -2.23
Total  Assets  -4E-05  4E-05  -0.95
St.  Dev.  of First-Diff.  Log  Prices  0.99  1.02  0.97
Adjusted  R-squared  0.05  S.E.  of regression  0.06
Dependent  Variable:  NAV  ADJUSMENT
(alpha2  coefficients,  higher  values  imply  faster  adjustments)
Regression  4:
Number  of Observations:  61
Independent  Variables:
Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic
Constant  0.07  0.04  1.59
St.  Dev.  of First-Diff.  Log  Prices  -0.91  0.83  -1.10
Adjusted  R-squared  0.02  S.E.  of regression  0.04
Reoression  5:
Number  of Observations:  61
Independent  Variables:
Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-StaKtic
Constant  0.08  0.04  1.85
St. Dev.  of First-Diff.  Log  Prices  -1.55  0.84  -1.85
St. Dev.  of First-Diff.  Log  NAVs  0.67  0.45  1.49
Adjusted  R-squared  0.02  S.E.  of regression  0.04
.( ) r**i  Implies  significance  at 10%,  (5%),  [1%].related to slower price adjustments. The higher the misperception, the less related NAVs and prices
are. Our results do not support this hypothesis, since the volatility of the country fund market is not
statistically significant and is positively related to  the  speed of  adjustment of  prices to  NAVs.
Nevertheless, our results favor the asymmetric  information model.
m.  Applications of Asymmetric Information
This section introduces applications of asymmetric  information to the recent financial  crises in
Mexico 1994-95 and Asia 1997. The asymmetric information hypothesis suggests that the market
for the underlying assets has more information than the country fund market. Therefore, we expect
NA'Vs to react first to an ongoing crisis, anticipating  the decline in fund prices. When the fall in
NA'Vs  is large relative to fund prices, average discounts turn to premia before or at the beginning of
the crisis. Figure 3 shows that this has been the case for most funds that invest in the countries
involved in the recent episodes. 
13
Frankel and Schmukler (1996) show that NAVs of the three Mexican funds fell before and
faster than fund prices, prior to the Mexican devaluation of December 20, 1994. We interpret this
fact as evidence that Mexican investors (the main holders of the underlying assets) reacted to the
crisis of 1994 before foreign investors. Mexican investors probably knew more and foresaw the
crisis, while small American investors reacted with a lag.
In the case of the more recent Asian crisis we study the four countries that have been initially
affected by the crisis: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The crisis erupted with the
Thai Bath's  free floating and depreciation on July 2, 1997. Thailand had been perceived as facing
macroeconomic and financial  vulnerability. The stock market had been falling since its peak in 1995
15FIGURE  3
DISCOUNTS  AT THE  BEGINNING  OF  CRISES
Emerging Mexico Fund  (MEF),  Mexico Equity and Income  Fund  Malaysia  Fund (MF)  and First Philippine  Fund (FPF)  Discount
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7/2/97  Flotation:./14/97along with the two Thai country fund NAVs and prices. Nevertheless average discounts turned into
premia by the end of 1996. After January 1997 the premia increased steadily, as if holders of the
underlying assets were more aware of how fragile Thailand's financial  sector was.
The Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia followed Thailand by free floating their exchange
rates on July 12, July 14, and August 14 respectively. Part of the transmission to these countries has
been interpreted as being pure contagion. The crisis in Indonesia seems to have been unexpected.
The Indonesian stock market index did not decline as the others did. But  right before the crisis,
NAVs fell sharply turning small discounts into premia on the week of the rupiah's free floating. This
type of behavior seems similar to the Mexican example. In the case of the Philippines and Malaysia
we observe discounts shrinking before the free floating, and turning into premia afterwards. This
kind of evidence suggests that the holders of the underlying assets were more pessimistic than the
country fund holders after the currency depreciation in each country, as if they have understood
more quickly the extent of the crisis.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has addressed several issues concerning country funds. The main finding of the paper is
that country funds support the hypothesis of asymmetric information.  We estimated error-correction
models for each country fund, since the variables appeared to be  non-stationary and due to  the
existence of cointegration between NAVs and prices. The exogeneity tests  concluded that NAVs
tend to  be  the exogenous  variable. In  other words,  past  NAVs and  discounts  predict current
changes in  country fund prices more often than  past fund prices and  discounts predict current
16changes in NAVs. This relationship held in general for the three regions studied, namely Europe,
Latin America, and the Pacific Rim.
The results appeared robust to various specifications. Whlen  cointegration was (not) assumed,
we rejected the null hypothesis of strongly exogenous prices in 70 (73) percent of the funds, while
we only rejected the null hypothesis of strongly exogenous NAVs in 30 (33) percent of the funds.
On the other hand, when ruling out cointegration, we found that prices adjust in 61 percent of the
cases to  short-run changes in NAV, while NAVs adjust in 33 percent  of the cases to  short-run
changes in prices. We found this evidence consistent with asyrnmetric  information. NAVs seem to
be closer to local information; they are the asset prices that react first to local news. Later on, the
country fund holders receive the information, so prices react after NAVs have reacted. This type of
behavior can be observed in Figure 3, where the Mexican and Asian country fund discounts are
plotted around the recent currency crises.
Our empirical analysis also found sluggish adjustments tc the long-run relationships between
NAVs and prices. In other words, NAVs and prices react to larjge  discounts more slowly than what
asymmetric information predicts. Thus, we explored the statistical relationship between the speeds
of adjustment and other variables. We worked with each market's variability as a measure of noise
in the markets. The tests showed that there is a statistically  significant negative relationship between
the price adjustment coefficients and the  standard deviation of first-differenced log NAVs.  We
found a similar relationship between the NAV adjustment coefficients and the standard deviation of
first-differenced log  prices. However,  we  failed to  find  a  significant relationship between  the
adjustment coefficients  and the variability of the markets where the assets trade.
The model introduced  in the  Appendix explains why one  might  expect  average  positive
discounts to  be the norm. Assuming asymmetric information, the theoretical model entails three
17propositions. In the first proposition, the model shows that discounts are on average positive. The
second proposition shows that  changes in NAVs help to  predict  changes in  prices. The third
proposition extends the results by introducing noise traders; thus NAVs are not fully revealing. The
last itheoretical  proposition demonstrates that the reaction of prices to NAVs is only partial.
The asymmetric information approach presents two main advantages over the "noise traders
model." First, it has enabled us to derive average positive discounts even excluding noise traders or
irrational agents from the model. In addition, it has allowed us to include noise traders in the market
of country funds as well as in the market of underlying assets. Thereby, we could see how noise in
both markets affects the adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium. Finally, we have been able to
test empirically  the asymmetric information  hypothesis against the noise traders model.
18Appendix - A Model of Asymmetric Information
This appendix introduces a model that captures our primary empirical findings. We assume a world
of overlapping generations with two-period-lived domestic and international investors.  1
4 "Domestic
investors" are both residents of the country (where the underlying assets are being traded) and large
international investors (who have the same information than local residents). "Foreign investors" are
small international investors  who  buy  the  other  country's  assets.  Their utility  functions  are
respectively described by
U =-e  -(2y)w,  U* =  -e-(2y.W  (2)
y represents the degree of absolute risk aversion, and W and WR  stand for their wealth. The asterisk
(*) denotes foreign investors' variables.
In  period  1,  investors  choose  their  portfolio to  maximize future  expected utility.  They
consume all their wealth in period 2 and leave no bequests to future generations. Two assets are
available in the economy: a safe asset and a risky one. The safe asset, which we think of as U.S.
government bonds, has a perfectly elastic supply and pays a return r. Its price is normalized to  1.
The risky asset is a basket of securities from the domestic country. The risky asset can be held
directly or via holding the respective country fund. P, is the foreign market price of the country
funds. Nt is the NAV, the domestic value of the portfolio of underlying assets (denominated in the
foreign currency). We assume that  both P,  and N, are  observable at  any point in  time. 15 The
domestic and foreign investor's demand functions are qt, qt,  , and Of,.
Investors maximize their expected utility in period 1, choosing their demand for risk-free and
risky securities. Their wealth in the period they consume are
19W,+,  = W,  (1I+  r) +  o)n  (N,+,  +  Yt+,  - N, (I +  r)) +  Of (P,+, + ytf I - P,  (I + r))
+  W*(1)i(N  +  y,  - N, (1  +  r)) +  ±&  (P,  +  ytf  - P (1+  r))t
The only difference between domestic and foreign investors is reflected on how they perceive
future diividends.  Given their information set  It ,  domestic investors perceive the dividends of the
underlying assets to be
Yt+,  =  Yt + Et+'  (4)
6t+,  is the unexpected shock to the underlying assets' fundamentals. Foreign investors perceive the
dividends of the underlying assets to follow
yt+, = Yt  + 6t+l + i1t+,'  (5)
At+,  is noise that  foreign investors face due to  asymmetric information about foreign countries.
Finally, when both domestic and foreign investors buy the country fund, dividends are perceived to
be
f
Yt+I = Yt  + 6t+,  +  P+  (6)
Pt., reflects uncertainty about the fund manager's quality.
We assume that the shocks to dividends  have the following distribution
£t  (°  7  cr  0  0
Lt +NL  O  0  0  ,jj  (7)
The assumptions made in equations (4)-(7) imply that expected values do not vary with the
type of investment or with the type of investor,
E(yf+l  I)  = E*  (yt]-,t  I*) = E(yf  I  II,) = E*y  (+,III*) =  Yt  (8)
On the other hand, the conditional variances when buying the underlying assets are
20Var (yt+It)=a  2 +o2  >Var(y+,1II,)  = U2,  (9)
while the conditional variances when buying the country fund are
Var(Ytt+ljI  ) =CF2 + C2  =Var*(YtSl  It+).  (0
In summary, for foreign investors the conditional variance of buying the underlying assets is
higher than the conditional variance of buying country funds. The reverse is true  for domestic
investors.
II  U  U  2 +02  2L..(/ 1 I)>a(~ 1 I)o. Var  (yt+±It  )=  T>  Var* (yf  II)=b=  Var  (yf+I  II  )>Var(yt,,  II  a  (11)
Given that domestic investors have better information about tlle local economy, foreign investors
perceive a higher variance than domestic investors when buying the underlying assets. However,
since the manager decides the portfolio composition of the country fund, the domestic investors'
information advantage is lost and their conditional variance increases when buying country funds.
On the other hand, country fund managers have a better understanding of the country where they
invest than foreign investors. As a consequence, foreign investors' conditional variance decreases if
they switch from acquiring the underlying assets to buying the country fund.
Proposition 1:
Discounts are strictly positive if the difference in information is greater than zero. Given
that cr 2 > U 2,>p  if  U  > 0, N, - P, > °
Proof:  Since returns  are assumed to  be  normally distributed, investors maximize the  following
conditional expected utility functions
E(U,,  Ij,) = E(WT+, 1I  )-yVar(WJ+ 1f II,)  (12)
E*(Ut  I  II*) = E*(W*i,II* )-yVar*(W7;fII:)-
21In equilibrium,  domestic (foreign) investors will only buy the underlying assets (country fund).
Given that the dividends to both assets are perfectly correlated, there is no benefit to diversification.
Moreover, one group of investors will buy the country fund while the other group will buy the
underlying assets. If both groups of investors decided to buy the underlying assets (country funds),
P, (N, ) would go to zero. Finally,  given the assumptions about the conditional variances, domestic
(foreign) investors reduce their risk by only acquiring the underlying assets (country fund)." 6 There
is nothing here that  prevents domestic (foreign) investors to  buy the  country fund (underlying
assets). So discounts will lie within an interval before prompting investors to shift assets.
We solve the equilibrium case in which domestic investors buy the underlying assets and
foreign investors buy the country fund shares. They maximize the following conditional expected
utility functions
E(U,,  II,) =W,  (1 + r)  + 0  (E(N+I  + y+)  - N, (I + r))  - yq52Var(Nt+,  + yt+l|I
and  (13)
E* (U  III*)= WI(1+  r) +±f(E(P,+  +y  f1) - Pt(1  +r))  - y&f2Var*(P  , +yf,I4I).
The maximization  process yields the following demand functions for the underlying assets and
for the country fund
(N  =  (E(N,+,  + Yt+,)  - Nt (1  +  r)),
2rVar(N,+, + y,+, lIIt  )
and  (14)
2yVar *(+  y  fY  )-Pjl±r))
The equilibrium  conditions for the risky assets are,
QtS  and  ¢t*f = Sf.  (15)
22We assume that S" and 5  (the supplies of underlying assets and country funds) are fixed and equal
to S.
To solve for NAVs and country fund prices, we impose that the unconditional distributions of
N,,+ and P,+, are identical to the distributions of N, and Pt. We also know that
Var(N,+ 1 + yt 1lit  = E[(Nt+I + Yt+ 1 E(Nt+l  +yt+ 1 ))2  II,]
and  (16)
Var  *(PE+  +  y1f, II*)  = E* [(P,+.  +  yft  -E(Pt+  + Yf)) 2 I:].
Then, using the demand functions and the equilibrium conditions, we  obtain the following
steady-state closed-form expressions
N  ={y1  [y  _2y  r  2  2  (17)
Pt =  - Y  Y(u  +  aH 
Finally, we can derive the following expression for the country fund discount
Nt  Pt = S3Yo2r  >O  (18)
QED
Proposition 2:
NA Vs explain fund prices when they deviate  from the equilibrium discounts.
Proof: We now assume that domestic investors receive some private information (06,,  )  at time t,
regarding future shocks to the dividends. Then, expected values differ,
E(y,+  It)  = Yt  t+1  Ot,  E  E*(yf+lIt  Yt  (19)
23Any deviation of the NAVs from the equilibrium discount is informative for foreign investors,
who interpret this change as news about future dividends. The private information foreign investors
receive is transmitted to foreign investors through changes in NAVs. So, the new expected utility
function is
E*(tlt+,JI*  ,|Nt - PI,|  >S2  3  ¢5)  = Wt*+  (I +  r) +  O*f  (E(P,,, +  y,<l)  +  (N, - P,) - P,  (I +  r)) r3 11  (20)
-yVar*(P,+,  +±Yt 1 <I*)4
Then, prices respond to changes in NAVs when discounts are large
pI  I  [y, + N,  - S2/  (a 2 +  CT2]  (21)
QED
Proposition 3:
The presence  of  noise  traders  implies that NA Vs can  vary  due  to  new  information
received or to deviations in noise traders' misperceptions. The adjustments to changes in
NA Vs become slower because of a signal-extraction problem.
Proof: The representative domestic and foreign noise trader misperceives  the value of the assets by
a random variable  b77  and i7*,  respectively, such that
I  N(-77,o')  and 77*  - N(7*,o a)2  (22)
There is a fraction v  and  v* of  noise traders in both  markets. The domestic and  foreign
representative noise traders maximize:
24E(U,+,  II,)  = W,i,  (1  +  r)  +  eA7(E(N,+ 1 + y,+ ) - NO  (1 + r))  - yV7ar(Ni,,  + Y 1lIt)  +  n
and  (23)
E*(U*,II|  ) = W,j+11+r) + Xt  (E(P,+l  1+  ,+)-  t(+r)-y'a(P+  +  y,+l |It  +  ,t,
The closed-form  steady-state  NAV  is:
Nt  =!t  +±OE1+  +  (q,  +v-  - 7S2!  (  2  )2  1  (24) r  -I  +r  W7r  I  I
The  above  expression  shows  that  NAVs  are  affected  by  the  private  information  and  by
changes  in  the  noise  traders'  misperceptions.  Foreign  investors  only  observe  changes  in  NAVs.
They  do  not  know  whether  the  change  in  NAV  comes  from  locally  available  news  about
fundamentals  (Oc,+,) or from  shifts in noise  traders'  misperceptions  (i7t).  The only information  they
have is that  a change in the NAV  takes the following  form:
ANL =-I  1  +  r  (+  '  -t  )  (25)
Any change  in NAVs  is a noisy  signal of the  change  in fundamentals;  then,  foreign  investors
face  a  signal-extraction  problem.  The  distributions  of  shocks  to  news  and  to  misperceptions  are
public knowledge.  Both  shocks  are independent  and normally distributed,  therefore
E*(Oet iAAt)  - Cov(O8t,AA,t  (26)
(  . .)  Var(AN )  '(6
Foreign  investors  take  into account  the future  expected  change  in prices,  so the  maximization
process  yields that AP,  =>  E*(6st  JAN,), and
I+r~~~ 
AIt  1  (  1)  1  (27)
25The higher the noise in the local market, the slower the one-period adjustment of prices with respect
to NAVs, given that the number of noise traders (v) is positive. In other words,  the lower the
variability of noise relative to the total variability of NAVs and the fewer the noise traders, the more
revealing  NAVs are.  QED
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28Endnotes
l The Appendix Table describes the data used in the paper.
2  Discounts at time t are equal to 100*ln(NAVJ/price,).
3.  Figure I shows that funds start trading at premia. Funds like the Italy Fund, the Chile Fund, the
Malaysia Fund, and the Swiss Fund (although to a lesser degree) demonstrate this point. The
Korea and Mexico fund were established before 1985. Fund managers planned the initial  public
offerings (IPO) around a time of optimistic sentiments with respect to the specific country. Over
time discounts become positive.
4.  Noise traders in financial markets have been introduced by De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and
Waldmann (1990).
3.  It would be interesting to compare the size of country fund discounts versus the ones of
domestic funds. If the asymmetry in information is more present in international capital markets
than in domestic markets, one would expect to find deeper discounts in country funds than in
domestic closed-end funds. However, most of the country funds have been affected by
idiosyncratic country factors--like capital inflows--which would bias any valid comparison.
Perhaps, once country funds acquire a longer history, a comparison of discounts would be more
appropriate.
6  All econometric tests have been run with the variables in logarithms.
7. Results for all the funds are detailed in Frankel and Schmukler (1997).
8  If one of the variables is "weakly exogenous"--if it does not adjust to the long-run equilibrium--
only one equation of model (1) is sufficient  for efficient inference about the parameters 7t and
X.  Nevertheless, in the present case we are particularly interested in another issue: we want to
determine which variable is the one that responds to changes in the long-run equilibrium.
299. Note  that the  structure of the model implies that  the  expected a,  are negative, while the
expected a 2 are positive in order to have convergence towards the long-run equilibrium.
'O.  Other results are available  upon request to the authors.
". Part of our sensitivity analysis  is shown in Frankel and Schmukler (1997).
12  Note that the only data available are traded prices. Data such as the ask-bid spread would be
useful to analyze how liquid markets are. Unfortunately, this kind of data is not available.
13  Only discounts (but not NAVs or prices) are plotted in Figure 3 to make graphs clear.
14. This kind of model enables us to compare our results to earlier papers on closed-end country
funds such as De  Long,  Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (1990),  Lang, Litzenberger, and
Madrigal (1992),  Gehrig (1993), Hardouvelis, La Porta,  and Wizman (1994), and Klibanoff,
Lamont, and Wizman (1996).
15,  In practice, NAVs are published on a weekly basis. So the current NAV (Ne)  is unknown when
the country fund price is set. This fact needs to be considered to obtain the dynamics estimated
in the empirical part of the paper.
16.  This result looks plausible even though there are no public statistics about the nationality of
country fund holders. Surveyed country fund managers and administrators acknowledged that
country funds are mainly held by small U.S. investors. If country funds are considered "foreign
equities" relative to the underlying assets, we can relate this feature to the home-country bias
evidence. Several studies, like Lewis (1995), French and Poterba (1991), Gehrig (1993), and
Tesar and Werner (1994), document its presence in international financial markets.
30APPENDIX  TABLE
DATA DESCRIPTION
SAMPLE OF CLOSED-END  COUNTRY  FUND
SAMPLE PERIOD 1/4/85-318196
SYMBOL  Initial Public  Offering (IPO)  Total Assets  (Mill.)  Portfolio  Turnover
(5131/1996)  (%- 1995)
EUROPEAN  FUNDS:
1 AUSTRIA  FUND  OST  9/21/89  135-7  27
2 EMERGING  GERMANY FUND  FRG  3/29/90  132.7  40
3 FIRST IBERIAN  FUND  IBF  4113138  71.6  43
4 FIRST ISRAEL  FUND  ISL  10'22/92  71.3  22
5 FRANCE  FUND  FR  5/30/86  #NIA  #N/A
6 FRANCE  GROWTH  FUND  FRF  5/10/90  193.5  49
7 FUT. GERMANY  FUND  FGF  3/9(90  #N/A  #N/A
8 GERMANY FUND  GER  7/18/86  208  41
9 GROWTH SPAIN  GSP  2114/90  234.2  #N/A
10 IRISH INVESTMENT  FUND  IRL  3/30/90  78.8  81
11 ITALY FUND  ITA  2/26186  101.1  58
12 NEW GERMANY  FUND  GF  1/24/90  531.7  #N/A
13 PORTUGAL  FUND  PGF  11/1/89  77.8  36
14 SPAIN FUND  SNF  6/21/88  118.4  38
15 SWISS HELVETIA FUND  SWZ  8/19/87  299.7  10
16 TURKISH  INVEST FUND  TKF  12/15/89  5.83  41.1
17 UNITED KINGDOM  FUND  UKM  8/6/87  63.8  63.6
LATIN  AMERICAN  FUNDS:  SYMBOL
1 ARGENTINA  FUND  AF  10/11/91  126.9  25
2 BRAZIL  EQUITY  BZL  4/3/92  72.6  55
3 BRAZIL FUND  BZF  3131/88  410.6  10
4 CHILE  FUND  CH  9/26/89  366.5  2
5 EMERGING  MEXICO  FUND  MEF  10/2190  11.4  83
6 HERZFELO  CARIBBEAN BASI  CUBA  9/10193  9  6
7 LATIN  AMERICA DLR INC FUN  LBF  7/24192  #NIA  #NIA
8 LATIN  AMERICA EQUITY  FO  LAO  10/22/91  146.1  27
9 LATIN  AMERICA INVESTMENT  LAM  6116/92  152.1  39
10 LATIN  AMERICAN  DISCOVER  LDF  7/25/90  164.4  122
11 MEXICO  EQUITY  AND INCOM  MXE  8/14/90  148.2  51
12 MEXICO  FUND  MXF  6/3/81  931.1  11
PACIFIC  RIM FUNDS:  SYMBOL
1 ASIA PACIFIC  FUND  APB  2/24/87  282.9  48
2 ASIA TIGERS FUND  GRR  11/18193  277.9  #N/A
3 CHINA FUND  CHN  7/10/92  140.4  #N/A
4 EMERGING  TIGERS FUND  TGF  2/25194  #N/A  #N/A
5 FIDELITY  ADV EMERG  ASIA F  FAE  3/18/94  139.4  #N/A
6 FIRST AUSTRALIA  FUND  IAF  12112/85  191.4  #N/A
7 FIRST PHILLIPINE  FUND  FPF  11/8/89  240.7  #N/A
8 GREATER  CHINA  FUND  GCH  7115/92  191.3  #N/A
9 INDIA FUND  IFN  2/14/94  329.6  #N/A
10 INDIA GROWTH  FUND  IGF  8112188  131.9  #N/A
11 INDONESIA  FUND  IF  3/1/90  48.2  #N/A
12 JAKARTA GROWTH  FUND  JGF  4110/90  48.1  #N/A
13 JAPAN EQUITY FUND  JEQ  3114/90  128.2  28
14 JAPAN FUND (Open-ended 19  JAP  4/12/62  #N/A  #N/A
15 JAPAN OTC EQTY  FUND  JOF  3/14190  99.3  79
16 JARDINE FLEMING CHINA FU  JFC  7/16/92  107.6  #N/A
17 JARDINE FLEMING INDIA FUN  JFI  3/3/94  109  #N/A
18 KOREA EQUITY  FUND  KEF  11/24/93  77.8  #N/A
19 KOREA FUND  KF  8/22/84  769.9  #N/A
20 KOREAN INVESTMENT  FUND  KIF  2/13/92  96.9  #N/A
21 MALAYSIA  FUND  MF  5/8/87  208.9  #N/A
22 PAKISTAN  INVESTMENT  FUN  PKF  12/16/93  86.5  #N/A
23 ROC  TAIWAN FUND  ROC  5/12/89  335  #N/A
24 SCHRODER  ASIAN GROWTH  SHF  7124/90  281.1  67
25 SCUDDER  NEW ASIA FUND  SAF  12/22/93  142.3  58
26 SINGAPORE  FUND  SGF  6/18/87  118.9  #N/A
27 TAIWAN EQUITY  FUND  TYW  7/18194  45.6  #NIA
25 TAIWAN FUND  TWN  12/16/83  335.5  #N/A
29 TEMPLETON  CHINA  WORLD  TCH  9/9193  266.8  #N/A
30 TEMPLETON  VIETNAM OPPT  TVF  9/15/94  114.1  #N/A
31 THAI CAPITAL  FUND  TC  5122/90  96.4  #N/A
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